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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Desiree Elaine Karst appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional guilty pleas

to possession

of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.

that the district court erred

Statement
In

Of The

Facts

When

it

On

appeal, Karst argues

denied her motion to suppress.

And Course Of The Proceedings

November 2017,

Sgt.

Jeremy Hyle of the Kootenai County

Sheriff’s

Ofﬁce effectuated

a stop on a vehicle for careless driving and for crossing the center double yellow lane divider.
(7/3 1/1 8 T11, p.9, Ls.15-20; p.10, L.7

of the vehicle. (7/31/18

— p.17, L3. 1)

Tr., p.20, Ls.1-6.)

passenger as Desiree Karst. (7/3 1/18
Sgt.

L.1.)

Hyle observed

Guydos provided

registration information.

that Karst

Sgt.

The

Sgt.

driver

Hyle made contact With the two occupants

was identiﬁed

However, 0n

his

Guydos, and the

Tr., p.21, Ls.1-9.)

was not wearing a

Hyle a Florida

seatbelt.

(7/3 1/18 T12, p.21, L.17

— p.22,

driver’s license, but did not provide insurance 0r

(7/31/18 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-15.) Sgt. Hyle returned to his patrol vehicle to

provide dispatch relevant information about Guydos and Karst.
L.1.)

as Jeffery

way back

t0 the patrol vehicle, Sgt.

(7/31/18 T11, p.23, L.18

Hyle paused

—

p.24,

for approximately

20

The three transcripts in the appellate record are all contained in a single PDF document. Citations
t0 transcript page numbers in this brief refer t0 the separate pagination of each transcript.
1

seconds to request, over his radio, that Deputy Rich Lyons respond to the location with his drug
dog. (7/3 1/18 T11, p.24, Ls.2-5; State’s Exhibit 2,

From his
his patrol

Florida.

vehicle, Sgt.

18122230482250?)

Hyle then conﬁrmed Karst’s

and learned from dispatch and

identity

computer database that Guydos’ driving privileges were suspended in Idaho but not in
(7/31/18 Tr., p.25,

L8

—

Sgt.

p.31, L.12.)

Hyle returned

t0

Guydos’ vehicle. (7/31/18

TL, p.30, Ls.13-24.) At that time, Guydos produced an Idaho driver’s license and conﬁrmed that

he did not have insurance 0n the vehicle. (7/3 1/1 8
t0 his patrol vehicle t0 write citations

lack 0f insurance.

Lyons informed

and

(7/31/18 Tr., p.34, L.2

Hyle

Sgt.

that the

Tr., p.3

1

,

L. 14

to further investigate

—

for driving

0n a suspended license and Without insurance.

Sgt.

L.5; State’s Exhibit 2, 18:44: 12-18144221.) Sgt.

—

to

hand over a small

to

— p.52,

tin that

time

Tr., p.49, Ls.4-17;

Hyle issued Guydos a citation

L.7; State’s Exhibit 2, 18:46:19

he observed 0n her

— p.56,

L.23.)

lap,

and a bag

-

citation for not

18:48:52.)

that

codes in Exhibit

2,

Sgt.

ordered Karst

Tr., p.56,

tin,

and

L.17 — p.58,

Hyle’s body camera Video, refer t0 the

program, and not t0 the running time 0f the Video starting
is

He then

seatbelt.

Methamphetamine was recovered from the

hour:minute:second reading displayed on the top of the screen
hour:minute:second reading

wearing a

he saw sticking out 0f Karst’s

marijuana and drug paraphernalia were recovered from the bag. (7/31/18

Citations

Deputy

this time,

18:45:32.)

pocket. (7/3 1/1 8 Tr., p.54, L.20

2

Hyle returned

(7/31/18 Tr., p.48, Ls.2-4; State’s

Hyle then made contact with Karst, and issued her a

(7/31/18 Tr., p.49, L.4

During

drug dog alerted on the vehicle. (7/31/18

— p.134,

Sgt.

Guydos’ license suspension and

p.42, L.6; p.47, Ls.7-25.)

p.129, L.19

Exhibit 2, 18:44:48

— p.33, L25.)

not displayed if the Video

is

when

at 0:00.

utilizing the

The

WGPlayer

state notes that this

played with other media players.

L.1; R., p.31.) Sgt.

marijuana.

Hyle and Deputy Lyons then searched the vehicle and recovered additional

(7/31/18 Tr., p.57, Ls.15-18; p.135, Ls.8—12; R., p.31.)

In the jail booking process

following her arrest, Karst was found t0 have marijuana and a marijuana pipe concealed in her
possession. (R., p.21.)

facility,

The

state

charged Karst with introduction of contraband into a correctional

and possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.13, 5 1-

53.)

Karst moved to suppress

all

of the evidence recovered by ofﬁcers in the course 0fthe trafﬁc

stop. (R., pp.59-72.) Karst asserted that Sgt. Hyle: (1) lacked reasonable suspicion for the trafﬁc

stop;3 (2) unlawfully extended the trafﬁc stop

by requesting

the drug dog, and

delaying the stop in order t0 give the dog time to sniff the vehicle;

and

by

intentionally

(3) unlawfully ordered

Karst t0 remove the bag containing the marijuana pipe from her pocket. (R., pp.64-72.) The state

ﬁled a

Memorandum

in Opposition in

Which

it

contested each 0f these grounds for suppression.

(R., pp.77-103.)

After a hearing (7/3 1/ 1 8 Tn), the district court granted Karst’s motion t0 suppress in part,

and denied

it

in part (R., pp.145-152).

The

court concluded that Sgt. Hyle did not intentionally

delay the trafﬁc stop or otherwise “drag his feet” in sorting through the complicated circumstances

surrounding Guydos’ license and insurance status.4 (R., pp.148-149.) The court also concluded

3

Karst later conceded, during the hearing 0n the motion t0 suppress, that Sgt. Hyle had reasonable

suspicion to stop the vehicle. (7/3 1/18 T11, p. 146, Ls.20-23.)
4

The

district court

did not speciﬁcally address whether Sgt. Hyle’s 20-second pause in the trafﬁc

dog be dispatched t0 the scene constituted an unlawful
pp.147-151.) However, as discussed below, both the state and

stop investigation to request that the drug

extension of the stop.

(E R.,

that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not authorize Sgt.

t0 give

him

suppresseds

the

bag from her pocket containing the marijuana pipe, and

(R.,

Hyle

to order Karst

that the pipe

must be

pp.150-151.)

Karst entered conditional guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and

drug paraphernalia, and the
correctional facility.6

L.11 — p.12, L.4.)

(R., pp.156,

164-168; 8/23/19

With the conditional

court’s partial denial 0f her

(R.,

agreed t0 dismiss the charge for introducing contraband into a

state

motion

Tr., p.2, L.1

p.24,

L24; 9/10/19

Tr., p.4,

pleas, Karst preserved her right to appeal the district

t0 suppress. (R., p. 1 56.) After the court entered the judgments

pp.176-181), Karst ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal (R., pp.185-189).

Karst argued this issue in the pre-hearing brieﬁng and
7/31/18 Tr., p.159, L.21
5

—

The

state

— p.162,

does not challenge

L.7; p.168, L.6

this

at the

— p.171,

hearing

itself.

(R., pp.65-67, 92-93;

L.8.)

conclusion 0n appeal.

6

The court initially declined to accept Karst’s guilty plea for possession of marijuana (8/23/ 19 Tr.,
p.24, L.12 — p.25, L.5), but then did so at a subsequent hearing (9/10/19 Tr., p.4, L.11 — p.12, L.4).
The

state did

not object to the court’s description 0f the

9/10/19 Tr., p.1

1,

L.24 —

p.12, L.1

1.)

latter

plea as

still

being conditional.

(E

ISSUE
Karst states the issue on appeal

Did

as:

the district court err

by denying Ms.

Karst’s motion t0 suppress

evidence obtained from an unlawfully prolonged trafﬁc stop?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Karst

failed t0

show

the district court erred

When

it

denied her motion t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
The

A.

District

Court Did Not Err

When It Denied Karst’s Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

Karst contends that Sgt. Hyle’s request that Deputy Lyons respond t0 the scene With his

drug dog constituted an abandonment of the original purpose of the trafﬁc stop and thus
impermissibly extended the duration of the stop. (Appellant’s

of the record and applicable law reveals that

Sgt.

brief, pp.6-10.)

However, a review

Hyle’s approximately 20-second pause t0

the request did not unlawfully extend the stop because

it

make

did not constitute an abandonment of Sgt.

Hyle’s investigation into the vehicle driver’s suspended license and lack of insurance, and 0f
Karst’s failure t0

wear a

seatbelt. Therefore,

Karst has failed to demonstrate that the

district court

erred in denying her motion to suppress.

B.

Standard

The

Of Review

appellate court reviews the denial of a motion t0 suppress using a bifurcated standard.

State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607,

389 P.3d 150, 152 (2016)

(citing State V.

206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)). The appellate court will accept the
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

However the
in light

Li. (citing

m,

147 Idaho

at

trial

Purdum, 147 Idaho
court’s ﬁndings 0f

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

appellate court freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles

of the facts found. Li (citing Purdum, 147 Idaho

at

207, 207 P.3d at 183).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That
The Trafﬁc Stop
Pursuant to the Fourth

Sgt.

Hvle Did Not Impermissiblv Prolong

Amendment of the United

States Constitution “[t]he right of the

people t0 be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not

be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

A police ofﬁcer may detain a person for

the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior “if there

person has committed or

is

about t0 commit a crime.” State

V.

is

an articulable suspicion that the

Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 76, 996 P.2d

292, 295 (2000) (quoting State

V.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992)). Such

a detention “is permissible if it

is

based upon speciﬁc articulable

the detained person

is,

has been, or

facts

which justify suspicion

about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State

is

139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223

(Ct.

(1968); United States V. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41

“Because a routine trafﬁc stop

is

1,

App. 2003)

Terry

(citing

V.

139 Idaho

at

v.

983, 88 P.3d at 1223.

Ohio, 392 U.S.

normally limited in scope and of short duration,

Ohio, 392 U.S.

“An

Sheldon,

1,

21

417 (1981)).

analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore
principles set forth in Terry

V.

that

1,

88

S. Ct.

is

more

analyzed under the

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).”

investigative detention

it is

m,

must be temporary and

last

n0

longer than necessary t0 effectuate the purpose 0fthe stop.” State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889,

187 P.3d 1261, 1264

(Ct.

App. 2008).

In Rodriguez V. United States, 575 U.S.

_, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612-1613 (2015), an ofﬁcer

issued a driver a written warning for an infraction after pulling
to grant the ofﬁcer

him

over.

When the driver refused

permission to walk his drug dog around the vehicle, the ofﬁcer detained him,

retrieved his drug dog, ran the

dog around the

vehicle after the drug dog altered.

I_d.

vehicle,

and then recovered contraband from the

Seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time the

at 1613.

ofﬁcer issued the written warning until the drug dog alerted.

The United

States

Supreme Court held

that the ofﬁcer’s extension

order t0 conduct a drug dog sniff violated the Fourth

seizures,

and

I_d.

0f the trafﬁc stop in

Amendment prohibition against unreasonable

that the ofﬁcer’s authority for seizing the driver

ended When the tasks

tied to the

trafﬁc infraction investigation were, 0r reasonably should have been, completed. Li. at 1614- 1 6 1 7.

The Court reasoned
in the course

that a

dog

0f a trafﬁc stop,

sniff does not fall into the “ordinary inquiries” that are permissible

rej ected

federal appellate court precedent that a brief departure

from

the purpose of the stop t0 conduct a suspicionless drug investigation could constitute a permissible

de minimis intrusion into an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, and rej ected the government’s

argument that an ofﬁcer

who

completes

all

pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.

trafﬁc-related tasks expeditiously earns extra time to

Li

at

16 1 4- 1 6 1 6.

The Idaho Supreme Court analyzed and applied Rodriguez

in Linze, 161 Idaho 605,

389

P.3d 150. In that case, in the course of conducting warrant checks during a trafﬁc stop, the ofﬁcer

paused
15 1.

to request that a

drug dog unit respond to the scene.

The ofﬁcer then continued

after the

M,

161 Idaho at 606, 389 P.3d at

the warrant check and citation—writing process, but paused again

drug dog and handler arrived

at the scene.

Li. at

606-607, 389 P.3d

at

151-152.

The

ofﬁcer served as backup during the dog sniff 0f the exterior of the vehicle and did not engage in
activities related t0 the

The dog

alerted

mission 0f the trafﬁc stop during

this time.

and contraband was recovered from the vehicle

Li. at 607,

389 P.3d

in the resulting search.

at 152.

I_d.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the ofﬁcer unlawfully extended the

seizure. Li. at 608-

The Court concluded that the ofﬁcer abandoned the

original purpose 0f

609, 389 P.3d at 153-154.

the trafﬁc stop; and in so doing, essentially initiated a

Because such a new seizure
suspicion

was lacking

is

unreasonable

new

seizure.

Li. at 609,

when unsupported by reasonable

389 P.3d

at 154.

suspicion, and such

in that instance, the ofﬁcer violated the driver’s Fourth

Amendment

rights

“by delaying the trafﬁc stop for two and a half minutes while performing a back—up function for a
drug dog sweep.”

I_d.

The Court did not expressly address whether

request for the drug dog violated the Fourth

On

Amendment.

EQ

at

the ofﬁcer’s brief call and

607-609, 389 P.3d at152-154.

appeal in this case, Karst does not challenge the district court’s conclusions regarding

(E

the overall length of the trafﬁc stop.

Rodriguez and

w,

Appellant’s brief pp.6-10.)

Instead, relying

Karst contends that Sgt. Hyle’s approximately 20-second pause in his trafﬁc

stop investigation t0 request that a drug

dog be deployed

t0 the scene constituted

an abandonment

0f the original purpose justifying the detention and thus unlawfully extended that detention.
Recently, in State V.

Still,

_

P.3d

made by

Karst.

In

request, over his radio, that a drug

St_i11,

(Id.)

_, 2019 WL 4050018 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019) (not yet

ﬁnal), a case With facts similar t0 the present case, the Idaho Court

similar t0 that

on

in the course

oprpeals rej ected an argument

of a trafﬁc stop, the ofﬁcer paused twice t0

dog be deployed t0 the scene.

St_i11

at

*

1.

The second

call

took

approximately 10 seconds and occurred While nothing related t0 the mission 0f the trafﬁc stop was
occurring.

St_i11

at *1-2.

The drug dog

arrived and alerted

completing a citation and written warning.
contraband.

I_d.

On

appeal,

Still,

St_i11

at

*

1.

0n the vehicle while the ofﬁcer was

A subsequent search ofthe vehicle revealed

relying 0n Rodriguez and Linze, argued that the second radio

a drug dog constituted an abandonment of the purpose of the seizure because

call to request

it

was

unrelated t0 the stop’s purpose, and thus resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment.

Li. at *3.

The Court of Appeals
and

w.

I_d.

at *3-5.

from Rodriguez

After acknowledging the holdings of those two cases, the Court of Appeals

concluded that “a radio

abandonment.”

rejected Still’s argument and distinguished the case

call t0 inquire if

Li. at *5.

a drug dog

is

available does not constitute a Rodriguez

The Court reasoned:

Ofﬁcer Clark did not abandon the purpose of the trafﬁc stop t0 engage in a separate
Unlike
Ofﬁcer Clark’s radio
investigation.
abandonment occurred
call,
in Rodriguez and Linze When ofﬁcers converted the trafﬁc stops into drug investigations by
engaging in drug-dog sniffs unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
Unlike the defendants
in Rodriguez and Linze who challenged the ofﬁcers’
conduct in relation to the drugdog sniff, Still challenges the radio call t0 the drug-dog ofﬁcer. However, Rodriguez does not
prohibit all conduct that in any way slows the ofﬁcer from completing the stop as fast as humanly
possible. It prohibits abandoning the stop t0 investigate other crimes. The Rodriguez Court took
135
issue With the investigation (i.e. the drug-dog sniff) itself. See Rodriguez,
U.S.
drug-dog
S. Ct. 1609. Here, Ofﬁcer Clark was not conducting a
sniff, taking safety measures
aimed at conducting a drug-dog sniff, or engaging in any other alternate investigation. At most, a
radio call t0 inquire if a drug-dog unit is available is a precursor to an alternate investigation.
Although the call may (or may not) result in an alternate investigation which may 0r may not pass
constitutional muster, the call itself does not amount t0 a Fourth Amendment Violation.
criminal

—

—,

We

cannot conclude that any pause during a trafﬁc stop requires a conclusion
under Rodriguez and Linze that the ofﬁcers abandoned the purpose 0fthe trafﬁc stop. In fact, such

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and is contrary to
United States Supreme Court precedent. Our conclusion, that n0 Fourth Amendment Violation
occurred, comports with Rodriguez, Linze, and this Court’s previous precedent, and gives meaning
to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
a conclusion

Li

is

inimical to the Fourth

(footnotes omitted).

10

The present case
all

in

analogous t0

is

0fthe same reasons as set forth in

St_i11,

and distinguishable from Rodriguez and Linze for

Sgt. Hyle, like the

St_i11.

ofﬁcer in

St_i11,

and unlike the ofﬁcers

Rodriguez and Linze, did not actually participate in the drug dog sniff 0f the vehicle.

therefore did not

into

status

Sgt. Hyle’s radio call t0 inquire if a

—

to

engage in a separate criminal investigation. As in

drug dog unit was available was,

an alternative investigation — not an investigation in

Hyle was

still

Hyle

abandon the purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop — and of the permissible investigations

Guydos’ license and insurance

St_i11,

Sgt.

in the process

itself.

By the

at

most, a precursor t0

time the drug dog altered, Sgt.

0f investigating the offenses against Guydos and Karst.

Sgt.

Hyle

never abandoned the purposes and mission 0f the trafﬁc stop, and therefore did not unlawfully
extend the stop.
Despite not having the beneﬁt 0f

holding of that case t0 the
state noted, in the context

(1) the

district court.

St_i11,7

In

its

the state argued consistently With the subsequent

brief in opposition t0 the motion to suppress, the

of arguing that Sgt. Hyle never abandoned the purpose of the stop,

ofﬁcer in Rodriguez unlawﬁllly extended the trafﬁc stop by effectuating the drug dog

deployment himself after the purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop had been fulﬁlled; and

M

(2) the

unlawfully extended the trafﬁc stop by serving as backup for another ofﬁcer

ofﬁcer in

who deployed

a drug dog. (R., pp.90-93.)

7

that:

Karst, likewise, did not have the beneﬁt 0f St_i11 at the time she ﬁled her Appellant’s brief.

11

The

district court correctly

of the trafﬁc

concluded that Sgt. Hyle did not unlawfully extend the duration

stop. Karst has therefore failed to

demonstrate that the

district court erred in

denying

her motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

district court’s

Court afﬁrm Karst’s judgment of conviction and the

order denying Karst’s motion to suppress.

DATED this

19th day of September, 2019.
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